Vertical Governance between Airlines and Airports - A Transaction Cost Analysis by Fuhr, Johannes & Beckers, Thorsten
Review of Network Economics                                                                                           Vol.5, Issue 4 – December 2006 
 
Vertical Governance between Airlines and Airports – A Transaction Cost 
Analysis 
JOHANNES FUHR *
Berlin University of Technology 
THORSTEN BECKERS 
Berlin University of Technology 
Abstract 
With airport privatization and infrastructure expansion projects taking place in the liberalized 
European air transport market, airport and airline companies are critically reevaluating their vertical 
governance structures. This paper analyzes the comparative efficiency of vertical governance 
structures in the airport-airline supply relationship. Using transaction cost economics as the lens of 
analysis, we develop propositions and present supporting qualitative case studies. Our propositions 
state that hub airlines and hub airports seek specialized governance structures, while value-based 
carriers and base airports enter into long-term contracts supported by complementary safeguards. 
These privately crafted governance modes complement or even replace external regulation. 
1 Introduction  
European liberalization of air transport has resulted in intense competition among 
established airlines and new airline business models. In this competitive environment, 
airlines are reevaluating their firm boundaries in the quest for further efficiency gains. This 
is particularly important for supply relations with air traffic control providers and airports 
– suppliers facing either privatization or strong pressure to invest in infrastructure 
expansion to meet rising demand. 
In both settings, (i) the equity sale of airports to private investors and (ii) the expansion 
of infrastructure capacity, airlines and infrastructure companies1 are forced to re-consider 
their vertical governance structures.2 Research on airports has traditionally focused on the 
welfare benefits of private ownership and regulatory aspects. In this paper, a different 
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1 The terms “infrastructure company” and “airport” are used synonymously in the following. 
2 Governance structure is defined as “an institutional matrix in which integrity of the transaction is decided” 
(Williamson 1996, p.378). 
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perspective is taken. Each of the two settings outlined is analyzed as a “boundary of the 
firm problem” in the interfirm supply relationship between airlines and airports. 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is applied to formulate propositions on how airports 
and airlines establish vertical coordination. The theory hypothesizes that the two partners 
will seek transaction-cost-minimizing governance structures, as these bring them closest to 
joint profit maximization (Ghosh and John 1999 and Williamson 1985). Transaction cost 
theory offers a particularly well-suited lens of analysis given its applicability to the central 
question of vertical integration and the strong empirical support for its hypotheses on 
economic organization.3
In the current paper, however, we consider its application to the supply relationship 
between airlines and airports as distinct from the usual empirical setting. Transactions 
between airlines and airports do not take place in an unregulated environment but are 
almost always governed (at least in part) by public owners and/or administered by 
government regulators. While competition is often assumed to sort out inefficient from 
efficient governance structures, its selection function in this context is limited due to the 
institutional constraints and recent nature of liberalization. As a consequence, we approach 
our research question by developing an informal explanatory framework and explorative 
case studies. We start by deriving research propositions, and then discuss them in the light 
of several case studies. 
As the starting point for our proposals, we argue that governance structures in the 
supply relationships hub airline and hub airport and value-base carrier and base airport 
are undergoing vertical re-alignment. We propose that hub-and-spoke carriers (HSC) seek 
strong hybrid governance structures, which display most characteristics of hierarchical 
governance. HSC evaluate the hold-up threat considering the safeguarding properties of 
the outside government regulator. Thus, if the regulator has a poor reputation and 
regulatory institutions are weak, HSC incentives to build private bilateral governance 
structures are strengthened. Hub airports, on the other hand, need a credible commitment 
from hub airlines prior to investing in specific hub infrastructure. 
Furthermore, we propose that weak hybrid governance structures are sought in the 
supply relationship between Value-Based Carriers (VBA) and base airports. While VBAs 
attempt to safeguard their sunk investment in regional and route-specific brand capital, 
base airports want to protect their investment in dedicated terminal capacity for their base 
carriers. We propose that these parties seek long-term contracts. Provided the base airport 
invests in new terminal capacity, complementary safeguards in the form of financial 
hostages or investment hostages are needed. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we identify the unit of analysis – the 
transaction – and analyze the antecedents of frequency, asset specificity, and uncertainty in 
airport-airline supply relations. In Section 3, we develop propositions on vertical 
governance in three research scenarios: (i) privatization of a hub airport, (ii) terminal 
expansion at a hub airport, and (iii) terminal expansion at a base airport. We present 
explorative case studies to corroborate and challenge the propositions. Section 4 concludes 
with a discussion of results and future fields of research.  
                                                 
3 See Boerner and Macher (2002), Klein (2005), and Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) for an overview on the 
extensive empirical literature. 
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2 Transactions between airlines and airports 
2.1 Transaction cost economics as the lens of analysis 
The question of vertical integration and the design of interfirm supply relationships has 
been discussed extensively in the literature on the theory of the firm. In his recent 
summary of the literature on vertical integration, Joskow states that “there is not and will 
never be one unified theory of vertical integration” (Joskow, 2005, p.320). The different 
theories can be classified into market power explanations and efficiency-based 
explanations4. TCE belongs to the latter. 
In the specific research context of airline/airport interfirm supply relationships, there 
has been discussion of the antitrust implications for airport lease agreements (Anonymous, 
1990), market power arguments (Dresner, et al. 2002, Serebrisky, 2003), and strategic 
alliances (Albers, et al., 2005). In our view, transaction cost theory offers a promising lens 
of analysis; with it, we hope to develop the first efficiency-based explanation for the 
realignment of airport/airline supply relationships from a comparative economics 
organization perspective. One of the theory’s main strengths is its operationalized 
framework. Furthermore, it has been validated by a large number of empirical studies. The 
TCE hypothesis on economic organization incorporates inefficiency in both the ex-ante 
investment decision, and at the ex-post level, in the contract execution phase.5  
2.2 The transaction as the unit of analysis  
Transaction cost economics owes its predictive power to the discriminating alignment 
hypothesis, which states that “transactions, which differ in their attributes, are aligned with 
governance structures, which differ in their cost and competencies, in a discriminating 
(mainly transaction-cost-economizing) way” (Williamson, 1991, p.277). Direct transaction 
costs include the cost of developing and maintaining an exchange relation, monitoring 
exchange behavior, and guarding against opportunism in exchange. Indirect transaction 
costs, on the other hand, encompass the opportunity cost of inferior performance of sub-
optimal governance structures, as well as the cost of maladaptation when critical 
information is revealed ex-post. 
To start with, we need a clear definition of the transaction, which will constitute our 
unit of analysis. We can identify the following major transactions and associated cost 
positions at the airline-airport interface6:  
                                                 
4 The most important literature based on the market power argument deals with strategic behavior aiming at 
raising rival’s cost in the short run or at foreclosing vertical markets in the long run (Aghion and Bolton, 
1987 and Ordover et al., 1990). Traditional efficiency-based theories use production cost explanations 
(Panzar, 1989) or frame vertical integration as a special solution to the double mark-up problem in 
successive monopolies (Tirole, 1988). The dominant theories in New Institutional Economics encompass the 
more formal property rights approach to vertical integration (Grossmann and Hart, 1986 and Hart and 
Moore, 1990) and transaction cost theory (Klein et al., 1978 and Williamson, 1971, 1985). In the strategic 
management literature, the boundaries of the firm are often discussed by drawing on resource-based or 
capabilities-based theories (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Teece et al., 1997; and Wernerfelt, 1984) and 
evolutionary arguments (Jacobides and Winter, 2005). 
5 The fact that airport infrastructure is a durable and long-term good will lead far-sighted decision-makers to 
assign particular importance to ex-post adjustments when deciding on the vertical governance structure. 
6 Transactions of approval and transactions of non-aviation commercial activities have been excluded as they 
do not directly occur between airlines and airports. Transactions of approval include all transactions between 
 388
Bereitgestellt von | Technische Universität Berlin
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 15.10.18 15:14
Review of Network Economics                                                                                           Vol.5, Issue 4 – December 2006 
 
(1)  Transactions of planning and construction are interactions between the infrastructure 
operators, construction companies, architects, and airlines in the design and the 
construction phase of the infrastructure. 
(2)  Transactions in the maintenance of infrastructure include all transactions aimed at 
maintaining the infrastructure at a defined level of service quality. 
(3)  Transactions in the development of infrastructure include all adjustments to the 
characteristics of the infrastructure during the period of operation, as customers and 
governmental bodies may demand these changes. 
(4) Transactions in daily operations consist of all activities in the direct operation of the 
infrastructure. Examples include terminal management, allocation of gates, baggage 
tracing, and apron control. 
While the latter three transactions occur in the operation stage, the planning and 
construction transactions take place in the investment stage. Through this up-front 
investment, the airport generates the option to use the infrastructure in the subsequent 
operating stage.7  
Therefore, the relevant transaction for our analysis is the one that occurs every time the 
airport grants the airline the right to use airport infrastructure – such as runways, aprons or 
terminal – in the operating stage. Defining the unit of analysis as this kind of transfer of a 
property right to use infrastructure, we aggregate the above transactions into a single 
transaction called usage of infrastructure. In determining how to price the transaction 
usage of infrastructure during the operating stage, the airport includes both the cost of the 
up-front investment as well as the cost of maintaining, developing, and operating the 
infrastructure. Figure 1 displays this temporal logic in the supply relationship between 
airline and airports. Airports and airlines determine the governance structure prior to the 
investment and operating stage8, as the decision on the specificity of the investment is 
endogenous to the determination of the governance structure. 
 
 
 
End of Infrastructure
Lifetime
Investment Stage Operating Stage
Determination of 
Governance Structure
Ex-ante Negotiations
Generation of Option to Transact
(Up-front investments i.e., cost of construction
and planning)
Transaction Usage of Infrastructure
(Re-coupment of up-front investment, costs of
maintenance, development, and operations)
Start of Operations
Figure 1: Transactions between airlines and airports 
                                                                                                                                                    
airports, governmental bodies, and non-government organizations during the process of ex-ante approval of 
the new infrastructure/airports. Transactions of commercial activities include all non-aviation activities, such 
as retailing, parking, etc.  
7 The logic described borrows from a TCE analysis on the interfirm supply relationships between railway 
companies and their rail track infrastructure suppliers, by Brenck et al. (2004). 
8 For the sake of simplicity, we do not enter into a discussion of the services (for example, terminal cleaning) 
being contracted out once the vertical governance structure between airline and airport has been established. 
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2.3 Transaction attributes 
Given our unit of analysis, the question is whether the attributes of the transaction usage of 
infrastructure are the same across all airline/airport supply relationships. In line with prior 
work on contractual relations in the nodes of the airline’s network, our working hypothesis 
is that discrete differences do exist (Fuhr, 2006 and Langner, 1995). In the following, we 
will explore the aspects of asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency in airline/airport 
supply relationships.  
 
2.3.1 Frequency distribution in airline networks 
Among the transaction attributes mentioned above, frequency is of secondary importance 
to the others. Non-specific transactions are still coordinated most efficiently in markets, 
even if they occur frequently. As specificity and uncertainty cause a comparative cost 
disadvantage for market coordination, frequency works in two opposing ways. On the one 
hand, high transaction frequency spreads the fixed cost of specialized governance 
structures over a large number of transactions. On the other, frequent interactions help 
build reputation, which functions as an informal safeguard (Williamson, 2005). 
The transaction frequency in the airline/airport supply relation depends on the airline’s 
network structure and the airport’s role in the network. 
In a hub-and-spoke network, economies of density and scope are exploited by bundling 
traffic at a central hub airport (Brueckner and Spiller, 1994 and Caves et al., 1984). On the 
supply side, the ability to employ larger aircraft types in both continental and 
intercontinental traffic, and higher productivity in ground operations result in significantly 
lower unit costs. Demand or market economies are achieved through the larger number of 
connections offered in a hub-and-spoke network. Integration of the hub-and-spoke carrier’s 
flight schedule with the networks of its airline alliance partners (Shy, 2001) allows for 
further exploitation of these economies. The resulting transaction frequency in the nodes of 
a hub-and-spoke network is as follows: 
(1) Hub Airports: HSC and airports display a high frequency of transactions (measured in 
landings), with the hub airline market share usually above 50%. 
(2) Secondary Airports9: HSC and airports display a moderate to high frequency of 
transactions. Traffic generated at these airports contributes a substantial part of feed 
into the network. 
(3) Other Spoke Airports. Transaction frequency is low, as these airports contribute a 
small portion of traffic to the network, but they are greatest in number.10 
In the United States, the hub-and-spoke system is considered an outcome of 
deregulation (Reynolds-Feighan, 2001 and Shy, 2001). Analysis of the temporal 
                                                 
9 The term secondary airport borrows from a classification of airports by Hirschhausen et al. (2004). 
Secondary airports are situated in large catchment areas, provide a large portion of the HSC network feeder 
traffic, and attract point-to-point traffic. 
10 Applying this classification, Fuhr (2006) finds the following cumulative frequency distribution in an 
empirical analysis of a hub-and spoke network: the two hub airports contribute 44.1% of all aircraft take-offs 
(54.5% of all departing passengers); adding the ten largest spoke airports brings the number to 75.7% 
(80.8%) with the remaining 58 spoke airports in the network contributing the other 24.3% (19.2%). All 
figures are derived from the analysis of a single European HSC for airports within the European Union. 
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configurations of European hub-and-spoke networks shows that HSCs in Europe have also 
increasingly relied on hubbing since deregulation (Burghouwt and De Wit, 2005). 
The second phenomenon resulting from deregulation has been the emergence of a 
competing business model. Value Based Airlines (VBA) – more commonly know as Low 
Cost Carriers – employ a linear network structure with short and mid-distance flights in 
their route portfolio.11 In these linear networks, frequency is more evenly distributed 
(Reynolds-Feighan, 2001). VBAs maintain supply relations with two types of airports: 
base airports and non-base airports. At a base airport, planes, personnel and in some cases 
supporting services (such as aircraft maintenance facilities) are stationed. These airports 
are located in attractive catchment areas, in which the VBA attempts to build a strong 
regional brand to generate demand for the large number of routes originating from the base 
airport. Similar to the relationship between hub carriers and hub airports, a single VBA 
dominates its base airports. Table 1 shows a selection of dominant carriers at hub or base 
airports, including their market shares and shares in the number of transfer passengers. 
 
Airport Business 
Model 
Dominant 
Carrier 
Market 
Share  
Transfer 
passenger12
Amsterdam (AMS) HSC KLM 76% 58% 
Frankfurt (FRA) HSC Lufthansa 75% 65% 
Paris (CDG) HSC Air France 73% 44% 
Munich (MUC) HSC Lufthansa 63% 46% 
Heathrow (LHR) HSC British Airways 51% 34% 
Hahn (HHN) VBA Ryanair 93% n/a 
Berlin (SXF) VBA Easyjet 46%  n/a 
Cologne (CGN) VBA Germanwings 31%  n/a 
Stansted (STN) VBA Ryanair 63%  n/a 
Luton (LTN) VBA Easyjet 58%  n/a 
Table 1: Market shares at European hub and base airports  
Source: MIDT, 2004. 
The transaction frequency in the supply relation between VBA and airport is as follows:  
(4) Base Airports: Transaction frequency between VBA and base airport is moderate to 
high. A single VBA dominates its base airport and disposes over a large market share. 
(5) Non-Base Airports: Transaction frequency is low, as these airports only connect to a 
few other airports in the linear network. 
                                                 
11 In the literature, there is no uniform definition of a Low Cost Carrier (LCC) or Value Based Airlines 
(VBA). In our study, we regard the linearity of the network structure as the key criterion. However, it should 
be noted that the sharp distinction between the classic VBA and the HSC business model is blurring due to 
the introduction of hybrid business models and network structures. Nevertheless, we regard the focus on the 
polar models as sufficient for our analysis. The abbreviations LCC and VBA are used synonymously. 
12 Market shares and transfer quotas are based on the number of departing passengers. At hub airports, 
alliance partners of the local HSC have been included. 
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2.3.2 Uncertainty 
The behavioral assumption of bounded rationality in TCE relaxes the classic assumption 
of perfect information. In consequence, individuals are unable to assign probabilistic 
values to future states of contingencies. Economic agents will thus estimate the degree and 
consequences of environmental uncertainty based on their past experience and present 
expectations. Both the frequency of disturbance as well as the degree of consequentiality 
determine the need and the required adaptive capabilities in exchange relationships 
(Ménard, 2004). Market coordination is best suited to coordinate exchange when 
uncertainty is low and market participants adapt autonomously on the basis of information 
provided via the market price mechanism. As uncertainty increases, price alone becomes 
unable to coordinate exchange efficiently. Autonomous adaptation is increasingly replaced 
by coordinated adaptation in hybrids, and in the extreme, substituted with full 
administrative controls13 in hierarchical governance (Williamson, 1991).  
As parameters of the state of nature are revealed, transaction partners face behavioral 
uncertainty of their counterpart as economic actors are assumed to be opportunistic. The 
resulting strategic behavior includes non-disclosure and disguise of relevant information in 
the adaptation process (Williamson, 1985). The resulting behavioral uncertainty has been 
conceptualized as the difficulty or cost of performance evaluation (Ghosh and John, 1999 
and Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Performance evaluation tends to be especially difficult 
with complex transactions, as “more details need to be accounted for and more dimensions 
exist in which something can go wrong” (Masten, 1984, p.193). 
As uncertainty is hard to define14, let alone to measure, we attempt to identify the 
extent and sources of uncertainty in the ex-ante determination of the price for the 
transaction usage of infrastructure in the operating stage. Farsighted airport planners will 
determine the pricing of the transaction based on the projected traffic growth, as well as an 
estimate of the investment volume and running cost during operations. If uncertainties are 
negligible, the partners can write a permanent long-term contract or define a price 
adjustment formula ex ante.  
In terminal and airport expansion projects – as in most infrastructure projects – costs 
are sunk the moment the capacity is generated, and time horizons of 30 years or longer are 
common. Substantial uncertainties exist on both the demand and the supply side of the 
transaction. They arise due to the following uncertainties: 
• accuracy of the demand forecast and the nature of demand 
• investment volume in the design, planning and construction phase 
• costs of infrastructure maintenance and operation 
• costs of infrastructure development due to technological changes, customer 
needs, or changes in legal or governmental regulations 
                                                 
13 Some researchers have argued that uncertainty acts as disincentive for vertical integration in high 
technology industries. For a discussion on the role of uncertainty on the generic governance modes market, 
hybrid, and hierarchy see Ménard (2004), Williamson (1991), and Rindfleisch and Heide (1997).  
14 See Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) for an analysis on the different definition of uncertainty in the TCE 
literature. See also Klein (2005) for a critique on the treatment of uncertainty in empirical studies in TCE. 
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When environmental uncertainty is introduced to the contracting problem described, 
the price determined ex-ante has to be adjusted as contingent states of demand and supply 
condition materialize. Since writing a complete contingent contract is either not feasible or 
comes at prohibitive costs, airlines and infrastructure suppliers enter into ex-post re-
negotiations. The effects of demand changes and cost developments on an equitable price 
of the transaction during the operating stage are difficult for outside parties to estimate, 
and it is thus impossible to objectively determine the adjusted price. In an attempt to 
estimate an “equitable”15 price, outside parties such as airlines or arbitrators face 
substantial information asymmetries. For example, airport suppliers can behave 
strategically, that is, not disclose full information on the true effects of the external 
changes.16 These information asymmetries have the most severe effect in complex 
transactions that take place between airlines and their hub airports and large secondary 
airports. Determination and allocation of costs, for example, becomes increasingly difficult 
as one moves from simple regional airports to larger airports with multi-product offerings. 
 
2.3.3 Asset specificity 
Asset specificity takes on a dominant role in TCE in explaining efficiency differentials 
between the generic governance modes of market, hybrid, and hierarchical governance. 
Exchange partners place value on a continuation of an existing exchange relationship 
based on their investments in relationship-specific assets. The resulting quasi-rent is 
defined as the excess of an asset’s value over the value of its best alternative use or user 
(Klein et al., 1978). This excess of return keeps the asset in its current use, and can include 
pure rents as well (Holmstrom and Roberts, 1998). In the literature, six different conditions 
of asset specificity have been developed: site, physical, human capital, brand, dedicated, 
temporal, and contractual asset specificity (Masten et al., 1991; Pirrong, 1993; and 
Williamson, 1985).  
Two characteristics of idiosyncratic investments are particularly noteworthy: first, 
mutual gains from specific investments exceed the gains of non-specific investments, and 
second, restricted redeployability of a relation-specific asset causes a fundamental 
transformation (Williamson, 1985). A fundamental transformation occurs as the build-up 
of specific assets turns a large number ex-ante bargaining situation for the supply of a good 
or a service into a small number bargaining situation ex-post. The resulting mutual 
dependency either occurs immediately through a joint investment or is built up 
continuously as partners invest in complementary assets (Ménard, 2004). We argue that 
these different forms of quasi-rent creation are of particular importance in our research 
settings. In the following, a distinction is thus needed between the airport’s and the 
airline’s perspective on the origins and extent of quasi-rents. 
 
 
                                                 
15 Partners to exchange have an incentive to devise terms that provide for an “equitable” division of ex-post 
contractual surpluses, as this minimizes the probability that contracts will be re-negotiated or performance 
will be evaded. See Masten and Saussier (2002) for a discussion on the term “equitable” in the literature. 
16 The example given refers to strategic behavior of the infrastructure company. Airlines, however, might as 
well behave strategically. Airports rely on growth estimates provided by the airline based on its expected 
success of its business model. These estimates might be over-estimate or inherent business risk might not be 
fully disclosed. 
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Airline Perspective. What are the antecedents of an airline’s quasi-rents in the supply 
relation with a particular airport? We argue that they are reflected in the cost of excluding 
the airport from its network (this includes the opportunity cost of foregone profits as well). 
To put it differently, to what extent can the airport hold up the airline by raising its prices 
for the usage of its infrastructure before the airline will either downgrade the airport in its 
network hierarchy or stop servicing the airport?17  
Intuitively, one would argue that quasi-rents are greatest for hub airports, less for large 
secondary airports with their substantial feeder traffic, and insignificant for simple spoke 
airports. In linear networks, on the other hand, the losses incurred for switching base 
airports will exceed the costs of substituting non-base airports in the network. We attempt 
to substantiate this intuition by exploring the nature of site-specific investments and 
investments in human capital and brand name capital in more detail.  
Site-specificity at hub and secondary airports includes the HSC’s investments in 
maintenance and training facilities to assure the high productivity of operations at these 
airports. However, a far greater source of quasi-rents is rooted in the optimization of the 
hub-and-spoke flight schedule. These quasi-rents originate through a mixture of human 
capital asset specificity in the scheduling process itself (Langner, 1995) and site specificity 
through grandfathered slots and bilateral traffic rights.18 Flight schedules are planned 
around the hub airport and are continuously optimized through a trial-and-error procedure 
in order to determine which (new) destinations are profitable or which combination of 
aircraft rotations result in the highest asset productivity. In this revolving scheduling 
process, slots and international traffic rights are taken into account as constraints. In 
consequence, the cost of switching a hub airport within a fully developed schedule will be 
extremely high. Secondary airports will also create quasi-rents, although to a lesser extent, 
as the upstream and downstream traffic is aligned with the banks of connecting flights in 
the hub. Again, as large secondary airports are slot-constrained, matching slot pairs are 
attained over time to optimize the feeding structure.  
In contrast to the bilateral dependency arising from site-specific investments and the 
specificity of human capital assets discussed above, quasi-rents will be far lower in the 
supply relations of value-based carriers with their airports. In most cases, training and 
technical maintenance is contracted out, airports in the networks are usually not slot-
constrained, and the VBA’s business model is not affected by international bilateral 
agreements.19 Even though the trial-and-error procedure determining the optimal route 
portfolio of point-to-point routes originating from a base airport still applies, the resulting 
quasi-rents are smaller. Optimization is less complex, being restricted to a subpart of the 
network, is based on a single aircraft type, and is subject to fewer constraints. Human 
capital asset specificity and site-specific investment are in most cases negligible. To a 
                                                 
17 Besides the extreme option of stopping to service the airport, the airline can change the hierarchical role of 
the airport in its network. HSCs might downgrade a former secondary airport to a simple spoke airport, while 
VBAs might turn a former base airport into a non-base airport.  
18 A slot is a time window in which the airline is entitled to use the runway of a congested airport. In Europe, 
slots are not allocated through markets, but are quasi-owned by airlines on a historical basis (“use it or lose it 
rule” or grandfather rights). Bilateral traffic agreements specify the traffic rights and the number of flights 
between two countries. These rights are not carrier-specific, but are tied to a specific airport or country.  
19 The full range of “freedoms of the air” are granted to carriers with operating certificates in the European 
Union since the implementation of the final liberalization package in 1997. 
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certain degree, site-specific investments at their large base airports occur as VBAs either 
invest in their own maintenance facilities or enter into long-term maintenance contracts.20
However, investment in brand building in the catchment area of the base airport is 
considered a substantial sunk cost. The success of the VBA business model is rooted 
primarily in lower unit costs due to employment of one single, large aircraft type, the high 
productivity of resources and personnel, and the omission of complexity-driven services. 
In order to attain a high seat load factor, VBAs must mobilize sufficient demand through 
lower prices and significant advertising expenditures in the respective catchment area. The 
value of such mobilized demand through the establishment of local “low-cost brands” at 
the catchment as well as at the route level causes the VBA to value a continuing 
relationship with its base airport supplier.  
A similar line of argument applies to the HSC and its sunk costs in brand building for 
transfer connections via its hub airport. Such decentralized and route-specific brand capital 
is built up through indirect distribution channels (via travel agencies) as well as with direct 
customers (Langner, 1995). 
Airport Perspective. In the preceding analysis on the antecedents of quasi-rent creation 
in hub-and-spoke and linear networks, we argued that most specific investments are of the 
continuous type and are gradually built up in the establishment of the airline’s network. 
Airports, on the other hand, are faced with a potential immediate creation of quasi-rents 
through an idiosyncratic “spot” investment. 
In our view, dedicated asset specificity and physical asset specificity of airport 
infrastructure are the antecedents to bilateral dependency between airports and specific 
carriers. The airport determines the specificity of the investment in its decision on the 
capacity and functionality of infrastructure in the early part of the planning and design 
stage.  
Assuming the airport intends to expand its terminal and/or runway capacity, it faces the 
option of investing in either a general-purpose asset or a specialized asset. A general-
purpose asset would provide sufficient capacity to serve local demand in the catchment 
area and include basic functionalities, that is, standard spoke terminal and continental 
runway technology. 
Now assume both airport and a particular airline can mutually gain through the 
(further) development of a hub-and-spoke network, given that adequate hub infrastructure 
is provided. Specialized hub infrastructure allows for optimal transfer processes and results 
in a comparative competitive advantage of the HSC. The infrastructure company is now 
confronted with an investment in relationship-specific infrastructure. 
Physical asset specificity is caused by terminal layouts specific to transfer passenger 
processes, investment in a high-speed and automated baggage system for dedicated logistic 
processes, and runways for intercontinental airplanes. Dedicated asset specificity exists as 
terminal and runway capacities are now designed not only to provide for local traffic, but 
for expected transfer traffic.  
For the airport to recover its sunk investments, it must work with the HSC for a defined 
period of time and for an expected traffic growth path. Quasi-rents accrue due to the 
difference in value between the optimal and the second-best use of the hub infrastructure. 
Following our classification of airports, this second-best use will be that of a secondary 
                                                 
20 The underlying logic of these investments at large base airports is an increase in aircraft productivity. The 
productivity gains are derived from the quick resolution of technical problems during operations and routine 
maintenance checks, which take place at night, when aircrafts are parked for their night stopovers. 
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airport in the HSC network. As argued above, it is unlikely that the infrastructure company 
will attract an equally well-suited HSC, as other hub-and-spoke carriers are already locked 
into their respective hub airports. 
So far our line of argument assumes that airports generally do not compete in the same 
catchment area or to attract new carriers. However, this assumption appears invalid 
particularly in the case of VBAs and their strategy of network expansion. These carriers 
evaluate and negotiate with various base airports across Europe prior to establishing new 
airports in their network. Non-base airports are unlikely to invest in new capacity, as 
underutilized existing capacity suffices in most cases to handle the additional volume. 
Potential base airports, however, are faced with infrastructure expansion at least on the 
terminal side when VBAs begin establishing large-scale operations. Even though VBAs 
demand general purpose infrastructure matching their low-cost business model (Barrett, 
2004), quasi-rents are created as dedicated capacity exposes the airport to a hold-up 
situation. In the early development of their linear network at the base airport, VBAs are 
still able to exit the catchment area or withhold growth at little cost. Alternative VBAs, on 
the other hand, will either be locked into their base airports or able to exploit the weak 
bargaining position of the airports due to sunk investments.  
3 Vertical governance: Some propositions 
So far, the focus has been on the attributes of frequency, uncertainty, and asset specificity 
of the transaction usage of infrastructure and on the differences in the stylized 
airline/airport supply relationships. Following the heuristics in TCE, specialized vertical 
governance structures should surface in supply relations between HSCs and their hub 
airports and VBAs and their base airports. We have argued that in these exchange 
relationships, transaction frequency is substantial, environmental uncertainty is significant, 
and relationship-specific investments of both the continuous and the immediate type occur. 
Based on our transaction cost reasoning, first propositions on the vertical governance 
decision are developed in three supply scenarios: (i) privatization of a hub airport, (ii) 
terminal expansion at a hub airport, and (iii) terminal expansion at a base airport. 
These propositions are supported and challenged via explorative case studies on 
occurrences of specialized vertical governance structures between airlines and airports. For 
scenario (i) privatization of a hub airport, we explore Lufthansa’s21 recent minority 
investment in Frankfurt International Airport. The Terminal 2 joint venture between 
Lufthansa and Munich Airport is subject to analysis in the second scenario. Third, we 
attempt to shed some light into the contracting practices between VBAs and base airports 
in Germany.  
We have several objectives in presenting these short case studies. First, we analyze the 
airlines’ and airports’ goals and incentives for creating specialized vertical governance 
modes. Second, we elaborate on the costs and competencies of the chosen organizational 
form and contrast them against a purely administered transaction by an outside regulator. 
Finally, we evaluate the degree to which the evidence presented corroborates our 
transaction cost reasoning and propositions. 
                                                 
21 Lufthansa German Airlines (Lufthansa) is a publicly listed company, which has been fully privatized since 
1997. Next to British Airways and Air France, it is Europe’s largest hub-and-spoke carrier. 
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3.1 Hub airport privatization  
The alignment with a transaction cost minimizing governance structure in the 
airline/airport supply relationship differs from the typical contractual problem addressed in 
the TCE empirical literature. In the majority of cases, the transaction usage of 
infrastructure is not privately governed in a dyadic supply relationship, but administered 
by a government regulator. The transaction cost (administered contract) perspective 
analyzes economic regulation in process terms rather than as a substitute for competitive 
market forces22 (Crocker and Masten, 1996).  
In his seminal work on regulation as an administered contract, Goldberg (Goldberg, 
1976, p.431) contrasts the perspectives as follows.  
“in searching for a rationale for regulation we should look not at the shape of the long-run average 
cost curve, but instead at the complexities involved in devising and administering such a contract … 
natural monopoly industries will be characterized … not by their alleged decreasing average cost: 
but by the feature which make long-term relationships between consumers and producers desirable”  
Further, Williamson (1999) argues from a comparative economic organization perspective 
that both public ownership23 and regulation as discrete governance modes offer safeguards 
against extreme conditions of bilateral dependency and information asymmetry beyond 
those that can be privately crafted. 
However, the relationship between airline and airport differs in important aspects to the 
usually stylized relationship between utility companies and consumers. First, the 
contractual problem is situated in the intermediate goods or services market. Thus, 
information asymmetries are less severe and it is feasible to create specialized governance 
structures. On the other hand, airports can only partially be considered a natural monopoly 
industry as they do face competition in certain market segments (Starkie, 2002). 
From an institutional point of view, airport price regulation represents a long-term 
contract between airports and airlines that is enforced by a third party – in our case, a 
government regulator. However, such trilateral governance of the transaction (Williamson, 
1985 and Wolf, 2004) might be further supported by a privately crafted dyadic governance 
structure.24  
Why is this? From the airline’s perspective, regulation represents a safeguard against 
opportunistic pricing behavior by the airport. The regulator evaluates the adequacy of the 
airport’s pricing proposal for the transaction usage of infrastructure on the basis of the cost 
and revenue data provided. The resulting price is then applicable to all airlines transacting 
with the airport. For the majority of airlines serving a hub airport, regulation represents a 
transaction cost minimizing governance structure. 
The local HSC, on the other hand, will be particularly vulnerable to hold-up by the 
airport, as it has accumulated large quasi-rents in the development of its hub-and-spoke 
schedule. As the hub airport makes the transition from public to private ownership, the 
local HSC will evaluate the safeguarding properties of the regulatory regime. In any case, 
the regulator faces a problem of information asymmetry in its evaluation of the adequacy 
                                                 
22 From the neoclassical perspective, price regulation represents a second-best response to a condition of 
(uncontested) natural monopoly. Regulation is considered as an imperfect substitute for competition. 
23 Public ownership is not subject to further analysis. We assume that public owners, intending to (partially) 
privatize a hub airport, will start to behave like private investors.  
24 The privatization of NATS (Air Traffic Control in the UK), for example, resulted in a strong hybrid 
governance structure (today 42% ownership stake by an airline consortium). As prices of NATS are 
determined via a price cap formula, regulation and vertical integration apparently act as complements. 
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of the airport’s pricing proposal. The complexity of the pricing decision for the transaction 
usage of infrastructure in the hub supply relationship will further facilitate the airport’s 
strategic behavior. Put differently, the cost of measuring current performance and 
estimating future performance in the determination of an equitable price may be extremely 
high for an outside party. The hub airport’s management may not fully disclose or may 
even distort information on the effects of parametric changes in cost or revenue conditions. 
Through the acquisition of equity ownership in its hub airport, the HSC becomes an inside 
party, and establishes a complementary private safeguard to regulation. A regulator with a 
high reputation and strong institutional support for enforcing regulation will mitigate the 
HSC’s incentive to seek equity ownership in its hub airport.  
 
Proposition 1a: HSCs seek equity ownership in their respective hub airports to safeguard 
their accumulated quasi-rents by accessing private enforcement mechanisms. 
 
Proposition 1b: Effective regulation and high reputation of the regulator will weaken the 
hub airline’s incentives to safeguard the transaction via a privately crafted, vertically 
integrated governance structure in its dyadic supply relationship with its hub airport.  
 
Case study 1: Privatization of Frankfurt International Airport 
Frankfurt airport is Lufthansa’s primary hub airport and the third-largest airport in Europe 
in terms of passengers (52.2 Mio. passengers in 2005). Lufthansa’s market share is about 
58%, and its share of transferring passenger amounts to approximately 65%. Frankfurt 
Airport is slot-constrained as it operates at its runway capacity limit most of the day.  
When Frankfurt Airport was partially privatized in 2001, its public owners sold 29.4% 
of the airport’s equity in an initial private offering. Prior to going public, ownership had 
been split between the federal government of Germany (25.9%), the federal state of Hessen 
(45.2%), and the city of Frankfurt (28.9%). In the last quarter of 2005, the federal 
government sold another 11.6% of its remaining shares via a private placement to 
institutional investors. In this second privatization tranche, Lufthansa acquired a 4.9% 
share in Frankfurt International Airport and has subsequently increased its stake to 9.1%. 
Lufthansa had several objectives in the acquisition of this minority equity stake: 
• More direct influence on the airport’s strategic and investment decisions via a 
seat on the supervisory board25 
• A higher degree of operational and process quality, based on a shared 
understanding of each company’s processes and objectives 
• Stronger control on the airport’s cost development 
In its strategic assessment of the European air transport market, Lufthansa stresses that 
competition is increasingly taking place at a new level: between whole air transport 
                                                 
25 According to the German law on co-determination (MitbestG), the supervisory board must be parity-
staffed by representatives of shareholders and employees. Active members of the board of directors are not 
allowed to serve on the supervisory board (§ 105 AktG), as the supervisory board’s main functions are to 
appoint and control the company’s board of directors. 
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systems rather than simply between airlines. This, in turn, requires a closer vertical 
coordination between hub carrier, hub airport, and national air traffic control.26
We have proposed that HSCs, faced with the privatization of their respective hub 
airports, will evaluate the safeguarding properties of the outside regulator. In comparison 
with sophisticated regulatory regimes, such as those in the UK, price regulation for 
Frankfurt Airport and its supporting regulatory institutions must be considered weak. The 
current cost-plus regulation is unlikely to serve as an appropriate safeguard.27 In line with 
proposition 1b, we argue that the conflict of interests of the federal state of Hessen in its 
dual role as regulator and owner, combined with the lack of well-developed regulatory 
institutions, has strengthened Lufthansa’s incentive to seek an equity stake. As its hub-and-
spoke network is fully developed and site-specific investments are large, Lufthansa aims to 
protect its accrued quasi-rents (proposition 1a). In contrast to a purely administered 
contract by an outside regulator, Lufthansa gains access to inside information as well as 
special enforcement mechanisms through its seat on the supervisory board. 
Frankfurt Airport’s upcoming investment volume amounts to approximately 3.4 billion 
euros for additional terminal and runway capacity until the year 2015 (Schulte, 2005). 
Lufthansa has stated its belief that as partial stakeholder it can exert a stronger influence on 
the focus and cost efficiency of these investments. Furthermore, Lufthansa’s equity stake 
gives evidence of a credible commitment to further investments in its network 
development at Frankfurt airport. 
3.2 Hub terminal expansion 
We proceed to the second scenario, in which both airport and HSC are faced with a hub 
terminal expansion and need to decide on the mode of vertical governance. 
From the airport’s perspective, price regulation does not serve as an adequate 
safeguard for quasi-rents created through a spot investment. Sunk costs in specialized 
terminal infrastructure and dedicated capacity render hub airports most vulnerable to hold-
up when the additional capacity is put into operation (t1 in Figure 2). The HSC’s threat of 
withholding growth is particularly credible in the early phase of infrastructure expansion 
projects. As time proceeds and expected demand materializes in the operating stage, the 
infrastructure company will gradually recoup its sunk cost by charging the airlines for the 
usage of infrastructure. As displayed in Figure 2, the airport’s decrease in quasi-rents runs 
in the opposite direction to the HSC’s accumulation of quasi-rents in its network 
development.  
 
 
                                                 
26 Another stepping stone towards a more tightly coordinated relationship with its infrastructure suppliers is 
Lufthansa’s plan to place a bid for the Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH (German Air Traffic Control), which 
is going to be privatized in 2006 (Lufthansa, 2006). 
27 Cost-plus regulation, in a narrow sense, does not exist in Germany. Under German law (§ 43-1 LuftVZO 
and §6 LuftVG), the regulatory agencies at the federal state level are bound to approve the airport’s charges 
proposal. The criteria usually applied are cost-relatedness, sustainability of infrastructure supply, and 
equitable discretion. The regulatory agencies, which are departments within one of the ministries at the 
federal state level, are thus not “true” economic regulators. In some instances, airlines and airports have 
negotiated contracts, attempting to assimilate a fee-cap contract. Once airport and airline have agreed on a 
fee cap formula, the airport will sign a contract under public law with the regulatory agency (for a 
comparison on regulatory institutions in Europe, see Wolf, 2003). Frankfurt airport, for example, has been 
governed by such a five-year “quasi” fee cap contract since 2002 (for a detailed analysis, see Klenk, 2004).  
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Figure 2: Development of quasi-rents in operating stage 
Hub airports, anticipating this hold-up situation, require a credible commitment by the 
hub airline prior to the specific investment. Such a credible commitment can take the form 
of a financial or investment hostage.28 If such a credible commitment is not given, the hub 
airport might refrain from investing in a specialized terminal asset in the first place.  
 
Proposition 2a: Hub airports need a credible commitment by the HSC in order to pursue a 
hub terminal infrastructure expansion project. 
 
The hub airport’s requirement for a jointly crafted investment hostage decreases if the 
specific infrastructure investment is undertaken for an established hub carrier. In the 
extreme, the new investment takes place at t2 in Figure 2, when the airport has recouped its 
specific investment over the lifetime of the infrastructure. In this case, the HSC’s extant 
quasi-rents, generated through its continuous complementary investments in its network 
development, serve as a sufficient credible commitment. 
 
Proposition 2b: Extant quasi-rents of the HSC serve as a credible commitment in a hub 
terminal expansion and mitigate the airport’s incentive to craft a joint investment hostage. 
 
In both cases, a HSC with either an established or a non-established hub-and-spoke 
network will anticipate the accumulation of quasi-rents during the upcoming operating 
stage (commencing at t2 / t1) of the infrastructure. Thus propositions 1a and 1b hold 
equally in a hub terminal expansion project. 
 
 
 
Case study 2: Hub terminal expansion at Munich Airport 
Terminal 2 at Munich Airport was built and operated by multiple joint venture companies 
of Lufthansa (40% ownership) and Munich Airport (60% ownership). With the 
                                                 
28 In his seminal work, Williamson (Williamson, 1983) discusses the role of hostages to support exchange in 
vertical supply relationships. Requirements for hostages, for example, equity ownership, may have ex-ante 
screening effects or ex-post bonding effects. For the hub airport, the latter in particular is significant.  
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inauguration of Terminal 2 in 2003, the airport doubled its terminal capacity to 50 million 
passengers. The overall investment volume for the new terminal amounted to 
approximately 1.6 billion euros, with 1.2 billion euros accruing to the joint venture 
activities, hence a respective Lufthansa stake of 480 million euros. Despite Lufthansa’s 
equity involvement, Munich Airport remains the formal owner and operator for all airport 
infrastructure facilities. The BOT project29 has not been accompanied by regulatory or 
institutional changes. Fees at Munich Airport are subject to the cost-plus regulation usual 
in Germany, with the Ministry of Commerce, Infrastructure, Transport and Technology of 
the federal state of Bavaria as responsible regulators.  
One wonders what might have been the contributing factors for both partners to set up 
such a unique governance structure. In the mid 90’s, Lufthansa was confronted with two, 
initially separate developments: first, Munich Airport intended to build a new terminal, as 
Terminal 1 was reaching its capacity limit, and second, growth at Lufthansa’s primary hub 
airport Frankfurt was limited due to a lack of runway capacity. Lufthansa’s strategic 
decision to follow a dual hub strategy and its need for terminal expansion at Munich 
Airport coincided, and resulted in the partnership. Lufthansa stated the following 
objectives for its equity involvement in the Terminal 2 expansion:  
• Optimal terminal layout to support hub operations 
• Branding Terminal 2 as a premium transferring facility for Lufthansa and Star 
Alliance customers 
• A competitive airport fee level to develop a second hub-and-spoke network  
Munich Airport, on the other hand, stated that its main objective for entering into a 
partnership with Lufthansa was to achieve a long-term commitment to develop Munich 
Airport as a second international hub airport in Germany (Klingenberg and Klingelhöfer, 
2003). Furthermore, the airport claims that the Terminal 2 infrastructure expansion 
provided the basis for a significant regional welfare gain. 
We have argued that the hub airport’s quasi-rents reside in a spot investment and are 
rooted in physical asset specificity and dedicated asset specificity. The doubling of 
terminal capacity can not be explained by the local demand in the Munich catchment area, 
which is comparatively small. Due to the lock-in of other European HSC at their hub 
airport, Munich Airport depends on Lufthansa to channel transfer passengers via Munich 
by investing into new routes. Other relationship-specific investments, such as the high-
speed automated baggage system, specialized boarding bridges, the three-story terminal 
layout, and a terminal satellite building, support the logistics and the transfer passenger 
and security-related processes of a hub operation. It is unlikely that in the absence of 
Lufthansa’s 40% equity stake, the specific investments in Terminal 2 in terms of 
functionality and capacity would have taken place. The existing Terminal 1 infrastructure 
was initially designed to support point-to-point traffic. In 1997, when the decision was 
made to jointly invest in a hub terminal, Lufthansa was in the early phase of developing its 
hub-and-spoke network in Munich (Burghouwt and De Wit, 2005). We argue that in line 
with proposition 2a, Munich Airport safeguarded the transaction usage of infrastructure, 
by requiring Lufthansa to commit an equity stake. Lufthansa’s 40% equity stake represents 
                                                 
29 Terminal 2 represents a BOT project (Build, Own, Transfer), and thus falls back into public ownership at 
the end of the operating stage. 
 401
Bereitgestellt von | Technische Universität Berlin
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 15.10.18 15:14
Review of Network Economics                                                                                           Vol.5, Issue 4 – December 2006 
 
an investment hostage, which, on the one hand, partially internalizes the relation-specific 
terminal investment and, on the other hand, binds Lufthansa to pursue the development of 
a second hub-and-spoke network at Munich Airport. 
We now turn to the analysis of the governance structures themselves and the influence 
of regulation regimes on the organization decision. The joint venture governance structure 
represents a strong form of hybrid coordination. In the investment stage of Terminal 2, two 
special-purpose companies (denoted as MOB and IMMO in Figure 3) and a parity-staffed 
project team enabled the formulation of the user requirements, quick assessment of cost-
benefit trade-offs and conflict resolution during the project. While the building company 
(FMBAU) executed and controlled orders with its subcontractors, IMMO and MOB held 
asset ownership and financing responsibility. A trilateral advisory council, consisting of 
public owners, senior airline management, and airport representatives, controlled and 
decided on issues in the investment stage. The resulting organizational set-up is displayed 
in Figure 3.  
 
 
Communication
Flughafen München GmbH
(Munich Airport)
Deutsche Lufthansa AG
(Lufthansa)
Project Team T2
(User requirements)
FMBAU
(building/ controlling)
MOB
(asset ownership: Munich
Airport 60%, Lufthansa 40%)
IMMO 
(asset ownership: Munich
Airport 60%, Lufthansa 40%)
Advisory Council
consisting representatives
of (public) owners, Airport 
Munich and Lufthansa
Order
Control
MoU
Figure 3: Vertical governance structure in the investment stage 
Source: Klingenberg and Klingelhöfer, 2003, p.115 
With the start of the operating stage, a separate joint venture company (T2-BG30) has 
taken over responsibility for running, maintaining, and developing Terminal 2. T2-BG is 
parity-staffed with employees from both partners and has autonomous responsibility for a 
sub-set of decisions related to operations, procurement of services, and marketing. 
Prior to investing in the joint venture, both partners negotiated a Memorandum of 
Understanding (denoted as MoU in figure 3), which outlines the spirit and the instruments 
of cooperation. In line with recent literature on the economics of hybrid governance 
(Ménard, 2004), one encounters the pooling of resources (capabilities of both, airport and 
hub airline, are accessed in both investment and operating stage), contracting (within the 
                                                 
30 The abbreviation T2-BG stands for Terminal 2 Betriebsgesellschaft, the name of the operating company of 
the Terminal 2. 
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joint venture a multitude of procurement contracts, for example, for ground handling 
services, exist) and competition (Terminal 2 and Terminal 1 compete for other airline 
customers). 
Munich Airport charges the airlines each time the transaction usage of infrastructure 
occurs.31 The cost base for the transaction usage of infrastructure includes depreciation, 
interest, running expenditures, and smaller investments for the development of both 
terminals. Conflicts on rent distribution will arise between carrier and airport, given that 
the pricing for the transaction usage of infrastructure needs to be adjusted continuously. 
Agreements need to be reached over such issues as the time span for cost recovery and the 
effects of deviations from forecasted traffic development. The joint determination of 
relevant cost information in the investment stage alleviates the problem of information 
asymmetry regarding re-financing needs during the operating stage. The information on 
the remaining cost positions and on the demand conditions can be evaluated mutually. 
Bilateral conflict-resolution mechanisms between the partners assure an equitable rent 
distribution. 
The need for a privately crafted governance structures appears to be of particular 
importance here, as Lufthansa could not depend on regulation to serve as a sufficient 
safeguard against opportunistic pricing. The superior information-sharing and conflict-
resolution mechanisms in the organizational set-up described corroborate propositions 1a 
and 1b.  
3.3 Low cost terminal expansion at base airport 
In their negotiations on the establishment of new bases in their network, value-based 
carriers face a large number bargaining situation with prospective airports ex-ante. 
However, once the VBA stations aircrafts and crews, invests in regional and route-specific 
brand-building, and in some rare cases, establishes an aircraft maintenance facility at its 
base airport, a fundamental transformation occurs. An ex-post change of its base airport or 
a downgrade to a non-base airport will result in a financial loss. A farsighted VBA, 
anticipating its increasing dependency on its base airports, will thus seek to protect these 
evolving quasi-rents in the development of its base airport.  
Prospective base airports, on the other hand, may or may not be faced with an 
investment in dedicated terminal capacity to accommodate the future growth of the VBA. 
Provided that idle capacity is not available, we argue that base airports will invest into 
dedicated terminal capacity.32
Therefore, it is efficient for both partners to enter into a long-term agreement. The 
rationale of these contracts is the VBA’s desire to fix prices in the long run, while the 
respective base airport attempts to assure a certain traffic development. Therefore, one 
would expect prices for the transaction usage of infrastructure to be fixed to a forecasted 
traffic development. Given that the base airport is vulnerable in the early phase of the 
network development, a unilateral commitment in the form of take-or-pay provisions or 
                                                 
31 The charges applicable to the usage of terminal infrastructure in Germany, include the passenger service 
charges and central infrastructure charges (for the usage of essential facilities for ground handling 
operations). 
32 Even though investment volumes in these general-purpose, low-cost facilities are low compared to hub 
terminal investments and to a certain extent marketable to alternative LCCs, we argue that airports seek some 
form of ex-ante protection for their quasi-rents. 
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investment hostages may be required. Such safeguards support continuity in the bilateral 
relationship. 
 
Proposition 3a: VBAs seek to establish long-term contractual safeguards with their base 
airports to protect against the expropriation of their quasi-rents.  
 
Proposition 3b: Base airports seek to establish complementary safeguards to protect their 
investment in carrier-specific infrastructure capacity. 
 
The relationships between VBAs and these airports are in many cases not explicitly 
administered by a regulator. However, VBAs and base airports are still faced with 
difficulties in their desire to enter into exclusive bilateral contracts, as airport charges are 
bound to be transparent, cost-related, and non-discriminatory.33 The legal regulations and 
guidelines affecting their contractual relationships have become increasingly complex. At 
the supranational level, the European Commission has recently specified in its State Aid 
Guidelines the circumstances in which a publicly owned airport can enter into marketing 
agreements. Any marketing agreement must be publicly announced, available to all 
interested carriers, temporally limited, and must pursue profit objectives. On the other 
hand, challenges might also be brought forward against discriminatory pricing, based on 
competition law at the European as well as at the national level. Examples of recent legal 
challenges include the Charleroi/Ryanair decision by the European Commission.  
Faced with these contracting constraints in their institutional environment, VBAs and 
base airports will hesitate to bring any contractual disputes to court. To a certain extent, 
they can expect reputation to serve as an informal safeguard that keeps the contract in a 
self-enforcing range. As quasi-rents and uncertainty become significant, however, 
complementary formal safeguards might be crafted as well to support the continuity of 
exchange.34
 
Proposition 3c: Base airports and VBAs seek complementary formal and informal 
safeguards, as they are uncertain about the enforceability of their exclusive bilateral long-
term agreements. 
 
Case Study 3: Contracting practices between VBAs and their base airports 
To substantiate these propositions, we investigate the contracting practices between VBAs 
and base airports in Germany and neighbouring countries. As the contractual relations 
described are confidential and sometimes informal, detailed information on the spirit and 
terms of these agreements are generally not available to outside parties. The following case 
study is based on information gathered from a series of informal expert interviews and the 
limited publicly available information.35 The contractual relations analyzed include both 
ongoing as well as prospective supply relationships between the base airports and VBAs. 
                                                 
33 The International Civil Airline Organization (ICAO) recommends these three core principles in 
determining airport charges. These principles are, however, not legally binding. 
34 Pioneering work in contracting under regulatory constraints has been undertaken by Palay (Palay, 1985). 
In his analysis on the supply relationship between shippers and railroad carriers, it was shown that parties 
avoid regulatory constraints by crafting informal agreements to safeguard their idiosyncratic investments. 
35 We conducted expert interviews with senior management at these base airports, senior procurement 
managers for airport services at VBAs and HSCs, as well as with other industry experts. 
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We have included these prospective exchange settings, when negotiations have already 
taken place, but contract execution hinges on blocked infrastructure expansion projects. 
Table 2 displays the investigated base airport/VBA supply relationships in Germany, and 
shows the investment volume along with the size of the terminal capacity expansion. 
Although some of these airports have expanded terminal capacity, we have only included 
terminal projects that qualified as a terminal expansions dedicated to a single VBA. 
Regional airports are defined as airports with a passenger volume of less than 1 million 
passengers per annum prior to the VBA’s expansion. 
 
Airport VBA Regional 
airport 
Terminal Capacity 
Expansion 
(Passenger p.a) 
Investment 
Volume  
Berlin (SXF) Germanwings/ Easyjet 
No 2.5 mill.  12.5 mill. €  
Bremen (BRE) Ryanair No 1.0 mill 10.0 mill. € 
Hahn (HHN) Ryanair Yes 4.5 mill. 25 mill. € 
Lübeck (LBC) Ryanair Yes N/A N/A 
Stuttgart (STR) Germanwings No None None 
Hamburg (HAM) Germanwings No None None 
Köln (CGN) Germanwings No None None 
Dortmund (DTM) Easyjet Yes None None 
Neuhardenberg  Ryanair Yes 1.0 mill. 5.0 mill. € 
Table 2: VBA – Base airport supply relationships in Germany  
In the supply relationships analyzed here between VBAs and base airports, three types 
of contractual agreements have been identified: (i) Long-term bilateral agreements (ii) 
marketing agreements / structural changes in airport charges, and (iii) investment hostages.  
In long-term bilateral agreements, VBAs and base airports set the number of airplanes 
stationed and passenger development. These contracts are of an either informal or formal 
nature. 
“Our new 10 year deal with Brussels Charleroi Airport commits Ryanair to invest $240M in new 
aircraft and deliver 2.3M passengers p.a.” (Michael O’Leary, CEO Ryanair, Ryanair press release, 
14 December 2005) 
Embedded in these bilateral agreements, we find contractual types (ii) and (iii).  
After a bilateral agreement has been reached to establish a new base airport, the airport 
will either heavily revise its airport charges and/or issue a tailor-made marketing program. 
These type (ii) agreements attempt to achieve two objectives: first, to provide a contractual 
safeguard to the base carrier for the fixation of prices in the long run, and second, to avoid 
legal disputes.36 In the cases observed, the new charges resulted in a significant pricing 
decrease in comparison to the prior airport charge structures. Through volume clauses and 
other special provisions, base airports attempt to tailor the agreement to base carriers. 
In some cases, we observed that VBAs were required to provide complementary formal 
safeguards in the form of investment hostages or financial hostages (type iii). Such 
hostages in the form of “take-or-pay clauses” and/or (partial) provision of capital to 
finance terminal investments serve as credible commitments to support specific 
                                                 
36 In the past, these marketing agreements were usually not made public. However, this is changing in 
response to the latest court rulings and guidelines at the European level. 
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investments in terminal capacity. In conjunction with the new infrastructure expansion at 
its base airport in Frankfurt-Hahn, Ryanair stated the following:  
“Ryanair has committed itself to invest one billion euros in the form of stationed aircraft at Hahn 
Airport. … with over 50 routes and eight million passengers per annum, Ryanair will turn Hahn 
airport into one of the largest and fastest growing airports in Germany. Furthermore, Ryanair will 
provide 12.5 million euros or 50% of the capital to the investment in the new passenger 
terminal. And on top of this, Ryanair will invest in an aircraft maintenance facility at Hahn 
airport.” (Michael O’Leary, CEO Ryanair, Ryanair press release, 11 November 2005, emphasis 
added, own translation) 
Another indication can be inferred from a statement by Infratil, a private airport operator 
that recently bought a 90% equity stake in Lübeck airport and intends to develop the 
airport as the Ryanair base airport for northern Germany. 
“Due to the adverse court ruling and [Lübeck] airport's resulting inability to extend the runway as 
planned, this agreement, in which Ryanair had agreed to guarantee a minimum number of 
passengers each year, starting at 1 million departing passengers in the year to October 2006, rising 
to 2.8 million departing passengers in year 10, has now lapsed“ (www.infratil.com, emphasis added) 
Parallel to its attempt to establish a new base airport in Lübeck, Ryanair has entered into a 
long-term agreement with publicly-owned Bremen Airport. Winning the airport’s recent 
European tender, Ryanair commits itself to deliver approximately one million passengers 
per annum. An essential part of the agreement is a long-term lease of an existing 
warehouse facility, which will be refurbished into an exclusive Ryanair terminal. Using 
this dedicated facility, allows Ryanair to avoid paying the passenger service and the central 
infrastructure fees for the existing terminal-related assets at Bremen Airport.  
Our expert interviews provided further evidence that small regional airports, in 
particular, seek a volume guarantee through a take-or-pay clause or through a financial or 
investment hostage. In cases in which idle terminal capacity was marketed, such 
complementary formal safeguards could not be found.  
As base airports become well established in their networks, it can be expected that 
VBAs will seek even stronger safeguards. At its home base Dublin, for example, Ryanair 
entered a detailed proposal to fund and construct a terminal with a passenger capacity of 
ten million in response to the Irish government’s call for investors in an independent 
second terminal at Dublin airport.37 Although the Irish Government decided against a 
competing second terminal, we regard Ryanair’s proposal for a specialized vertical 
governance structure as a response guarding its quasi-rents arising from sunk investments 
in brand capital and site-specific investments. 
4 Discussion 
We have set out to explore vertical governance between airlines and airports with 
transaction cost theory as our analytical framework. Airport privatization and 
infrastructure expansion projects lead airlines and airports to re-evaluate their “firm 
boundaries” in the context of the liberalized European air transport market. 
On the basis of five stylized airline/airport supply relationships in linear and hub-and-
spoke networks, we have argued that in each of these relationships, differences in the 
attributes of the transaction usage of infrastructure result in different contracting problems.  
                                                 
37 See McLay and Aisling (2005) for an overview on the issues involved of a second competing terminal at 
Dublin Airport. 
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The supply relationship HSC and hub airport in particular is characterized by high 
mutual dependency, high frequency, substantial uncertainty, and a high cost of 
performance evaluation. The HSC’s quasi-rents are rooted in site-specific assets (slots, 
traffic rights, and maintenance facilities) and specificity of human capital assets in the 
scheduling process. While most of the airline’s quasi-rents are built up continuously over 
the development of its hub-and-spoke schedule, quasi-rents at the hub airport are created 
through spot investments. New capacities in hub terminals are to a great extent specific in 
size and functionality to accommodate future growth in transfer passengers and to enable 
hubbing processes.  
In contrast to the typical dyadic interfirm relationship analyzed in the TCE literature, 
the transaction usage of infrastructure is usually administered by a government regulator 
or governed by a (partial) public owner. We proposed that regulators with a high 
reputation mitigate the HSC’s incentive to craft a parallel private governance structure. 
However, if the HSC does not expect the regulator to protect its quasi-rents sufficiently, it 
will seek (partial) equity ownership of its hub airport to access bilateral conflict resolution 
and enforcement mechanisms. 
Prices administered by a regulator, however, do not safeguard the hub airport’s quasi-
rents arising from a specific spot investment. We argue that an investment in hub terminal 
infrastructure exposes the airport to potential hold-ups of the hub carrier. In particular, 
HSCs, which have yet to invest in the development of their hub-and-spoke schedule, can 
mount a credible threat to expropriate these quasi-rents by withholding volume growth in 
hub development. We suggest that hub airports require a credible commitment by the hub 
airline prior to investing in a specific hub infrastructure.  
For the supply relationship between VBAs and base airports, we have argued that the 
base airport’s dependency on a particular VBA arises from a spot investment in dedicated 
terminal capacity. The VBA’s business model, on the other hand, requires significant 
investments in the development of a low-cost brand in the catchment area as well as at the 
route level. We have hypothesized that both parties will seek long-term agreements to 
safeguard both projected volume growth and prices for the transaction usage of 
infrastructure. We have argued – and presented initial evidence – that these contracts are 
supported by complementary safeguards (changes in airport fee structures, designated 
marketing programs). Smaller regional airports will furthermore require additional 
guarantees in the form of take-or-pay clauses or hostages prior to their investment 
decision.  
Three case studies have been presented to support our proposition as well as to reveal 
further opportunities for a more in-depth exploration of the complexities in the governance 
decision. 
First, airlines appear to be particularly concerned about the efficient provision of 
infrastructure in terms of cost as well as functionality in the investment stage. Transactions 
in the investment phase need to be analyzed at a more detailed level. Complementary 
theories, such as capability-based theory and organization theory, should be applied to 
reveal how different vertical governance structures facilitate the generation of innovation, 
that is, by building specific assets, in the first place.  
Second, the governance modes of regulation and (partial) public ownership need a 
more in-depth analysis. In contrast to the structural perspective of TCE, we have argued in 
this paper that privately crafted governance structures can act as a complement to 
regulation. However, we need to develop a more thorough understanding of how different 
 407
Bereitgestellt von | Technische Universität Berlin
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 15.10.18 15:14
Review of Network Economics                                                                                           Vol.5, Issue 4 – December 2006 
 
forms of regulation, in combination with public ownership and different institutional 
environments influence governance decisions between airlines and airports.  
Third, if our propositions hold, economic policy should design rules that allow for new 
vertical governance structures while keeping the potential for discriminatory practices to a 
minimum. Regulation has been shown to entail difficulties in dealing with hybrid 
organizational structures, as presented in our case studies (Ménard, 1998). Given our 
findings, we argue that these new organizational solutions enhance welfare and are not 
designed to soften competition. However, the “rules of the game” may still need to be 
modified. Research on the interdependencies between the institutional environment and the 
level of governance will certainly inform any policy decision.  
Finally, the evidence presented here needs to be supplemented by more in-depth 
studies. Upcoming privatization of airports and air traffic control, as well as new terminal 
expansion projects in the coming years, will provide further empirical evidence. In our 
view, detailed studies analyzing these specialized governance structures at the micro-
analytical level will be especially informative. Furthermore, comparative studies on the 
differences in vertical governance between airports and airlines in the different European 
countries and the United States will generate further evidence on the influence of the 
institutional environment. Our paper presents a first institutional explanation for recently 
observed changes in vertical governance between airlines and their infrastructure suppliers, 
but further work along related lines of research is much needed.  
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